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dealt with the March 1996 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which ruled that Washington state's 142-year-old law against assisted suicide is unconstitu tional. The second, Vacco v. Quill, 2 was an April 1996 rul ing of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which de clared that New York's law banning assisted suicide is unconstitutional. Although dealing with two separate cases, the arguments as well as the questions posed by the justices were reflective of the fact that, if the Supreme Court were to uphold either or both lower court deci sions, the course of society would change in a manner that would affect the lives of nearly everyone.
Defending the right of states to ban assisted suicide were New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco, Wash ington State Senior Assistant Attorney General William Williams, and the Department of Justice's Acting Solici tor General Walter Dellinger. Williams argued that a state's right to have laws against assisted suicide and eu thanasia is necessary for the protection of life, and vital to the prevention of abuse and undue influence. He pointed out that Washington's ban on assisted suicide was "forged at the common law, tempered by centuries of legal tradi tions and ratified by recent legislative action and by a di rect vote of the people of Washington." Williams was re ferring to the fact that, in 1991, Washington voters defeated a ballot initiative that would have legalized eu thanasia and assisted suicide. Dellinger made the practi calities of assisted suicide obvious when he asked that the justices bear in mind that the "least costly treatment for any illness is lethal medication," but that the task of the Court is not to provide a cheap and easy solution to healthcare problems. Vacco emphasized that upholding the lower court decisions would remove protection from those who need it. He explained that the question before the Court was, "Must a state remain neutral in the face of one of its citizens asking another to help kill her?" And he asked the justices to recognize the dangers that neu trality would pose. If the contents of oral arguments are • any indication, then it was clear that Williams, Vacco, and Dellinger had prevailed and that the Court will over turn the Second and Ninth Circuit Court decisions.
Attorneys Laurence Tribe and Kathryn Tucker, who support assisted suicide, faced harsh questioning from the justices and often used phrases and descriptions that convince general audiences but seemed less successful before the high court. For example, Tribe, who has ar gued many times before the Supreme Court, attempted to persuade the Court that since assisted suicide is al ready taking place, it should be regulated. "There are 50 state laboratories out there now, operating with the lights out," he said, claiming that if the practice were openly permitted, patients would have greater control over what is happening. This was met with skepticism by Jus tice Anthony Kennedy. Referring to the Report of the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 3 Ken nedy said, "The autonomy you're trying to project is illu sory" and would "be introducing fear into medical care facilities" while actually diminishing patient choice.
Tribe and Tucker often were asked why their con tention -that the decision to die with assistance was a matter of self-determination -would not apply to a per son who is experiencing emotional, rather than physical, pain. Neither was able to satisfactorily respond. Tucker stated that the person who is in emotional pain "may one day rejoice" that she did not have her life ended. Howev er, Justice David Souter stated that the same could be said of the person in physical pain. Tucker also tried to explain why the Court rather than legislatures should make determinations about laws pro hibiting assisted suicide. "Ours is a culture of denial of death," she said, and therefore states should not make these decisions. However, Justice Souter noted that Tuck er's argument actually showed that she was asking for something that was contrary to what the majority of peo ple want. As for the problem of limiting the practice of assisted suicide to a certain group of people who are dy ing, Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out that "the dying process has already begun" for all of us.
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Both circuit court decisions have been described as dealing with physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill patients who request it. However, the writ ten opinions made it clear that the impact would be far broader. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court majority opinion indicated that assisted death would extend be yond the terminally ill, competent adult and would in clude those who are not competent. Footnote 120 of that opinion confirmed that a third party would be able to re quest death for an incompetent patient: "Finally, we should make it clear that the decision of a duly appoint ed surrogate decision maker is for all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself."
Nor would this new right be limited to patients who self-administer a lethal dose. According to the opinion, written by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, "We recognize that in some instances, the patient may be unable to self-ad minister the drugs and that administration by the physi cian, or a person acting under his direction or control, may be the only way the patient may be able to receive them." 4 He further wrote, "We consider it less important who administers the medication than who determines whether the terminally ill person's life shall end." 5 Nowhere in the opinion did Judge Reinhardt provide a definition of "terminally ill," although he did give some emotionally charged descriptions to portray terminally ill people as those who "can only be maintained in a debili tated and deteriorating state, unable to enjoy the presence of family or friends," 6 or will end up in a "childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent." 7 As to limiting the scope of those who could "assist," the Ninth Circuit Court decision made it abundantly clear that, in addition to physician-assisted suicide, deaths that were family-, acquaintance-, or even strangerassisted would be permitted. In a footnote to the opinion, Judge Reinhardt stated that "those whose services are es sential" to bringing about death "are necessarily covered by our ruling," including pharmacists, other healthcare workers, and those "who help the patient to his death bed...." 8 The Second Circuit Court's opinion in Quill had car ried similarly broad implications, failing to provide a specific definition of "terminal." In finding that the state had no interest in preventing a patient from obtaining drugs to end life "during the final states of a terminal ill ness,"' the court either could not find, or did not look for, a way to explain what it meant by "terminal illness," let alone its "final stages."
Although the oral arguments seemed to indicate that the justices did not agree with the decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuit courts, veteran court watchers are quick to point out that the types of questions and the ap parent leanings of justices are not always an indication of how they will decide cases. The decisions of the Court in both cases are expected around late June and, no matter what the decisions may be, one thing is certain: the de bate over assisted suicide and euthanasia will continue.
